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INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION - BANKRUPTCY - THE
IMPACT OF THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RECOG-
NITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS ON THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY ACT.
Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Company, Ltd., 517 F.2d
512 (2d Cir. 1975)
Fotochrome, Inc., a United States corporation, and Copal
Company, Limited, a Japanese corporation neither present nor
doing business in the United States, joined issue where the laws
of arbitration and bankruptcy overlap. In 1966 the corporations
entered into a contract which called for Copal Company, Limited
(Copal) to manufacture cameras according to specifications pro-
vided by Fotochrome, Inc. (Fotochrome); Fotochrome was to
distribute the cameras in the United States. A dispute arose,
and the parties proceeded to arbitration before the Japanese
Commercial Arbitration Association (JCAA) in Toyko as pro-
vided in the contract. Before the Japanese board had reached its
decision, but after more than two years of arbitration, Fotochrome
filed a chapter XI bankruptcy petition in the United States.1
Thereupon the Referee in the U.S. bankruptcy proceeding,
pursuant to authority vested in him under the Bankruptcy Act,2
enjoined all creditors of Fotochrome from "commencing or con-
tinuing any actions, suits, arbitrations, or the enforcement of
any claim in any court against this debtor. . .. ,,3 The JCAA,
having received notice of the Referee's stay, nevertheless deter-
mined that the stay was legally ineffective as to them, and
continued the proceedings. Shortly thereafter, they issued an
award in favor of Copal. Copal filed the award with the Tokyo
District Court, rendering it a final judgment under Japanese law.4
Copal then filed a proof of claim in Fotochrome's bankruptcy
proceedings in the amount of the arbitral award. In response to
Fotochrome's challenge to this claim, the Referee determined
that the Japanese award would not be treated as a final judgment
1. Bankruptcy Act § 301 et seq., 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
2. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 2(a) (15), 11(a), 302, 311, 314, 11 U.S.C. §§ lla(15),
29(a), 702, 711, 714 (1970).
3. 517 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1975).
4. See Articles 799, 800, JAP. C. CiV. PRO., Book VIII, Law -No. 29 (April 29,
1890).
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in the bankruptcy proceeding and that the bankruptcy court
could reexamine the underlying dispute. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's5 reversal of
the Referee's decision.
The court of appeals was faced with the difficult task of
reconciling potential conflicts between the U.N. Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
(UN Convention) 6 and the U.S. Bankruptcy Act.7 Basically
the court addressed two issues: 1) whether an award issued by
the JCAA after the filing of a Chapter XI petition in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court is binding on the merits of the claim, and
2) whether such an award must be confirmed and reduced to a
domestic judgment before it is entitled to enforcement.
The court of appeals determined that, even assuming that
the Bankruptcy Court had the authority to stay domestic arbi-
tration, the stay issued by the Referee had no legal effect on the
JCAA or Copal, because the Bankruptcy Court lacked the requi-
site in personam or territorial jurisdiction over them. As a result,
the arbitral award issued by the JCAA, based on arbitration
begun before the petition in bankruptcy was filed, was valid on its
face.
The court of appeals determined that under Section 63a (5)
of the Bankruptcy Act,8 the Bankruptcy Court may recognize a
provable debt reduced to judgment after the bankruptcy petition
is filed but before discharge. The court concluded, however, that
an arbitral award could not be considered a judgment ipso facto,
because under the UN Convention9 the process of procuring a
5. 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
6. United Nations Convention on the Recoguition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38. The UN Convention was implemented in the United States by 9
U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970) and added to the statutory provisions for implementation
of domestic awards, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
7. Bankruptcy Act § 301 et seq., 11 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
8. Bankruptcy Act § 63a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(5) (1970).
9. Article III of the UN Convention requires enforcement of arbitral awards in
accordance with domestic procedure. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1970) provides:
The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal
or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in Article V of
the said Convention.
The court thus determined that these sections imply that the losing party must be
given the opportunity to raise the limited Article V defenses in a domestic court.
9 U.S.C. § 207 (1970) gives the federal district court jurisdiction over such matters.
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judgment based on an arbitral award involves the due process
right to contest the award on the limited statutory grounds out-
lined in Article V.10 The court thus merged treaty law with
bankruptcy law, and concluded that without the opportunity to
contest the confirmation of the arbitral award, the award could
not be submitted as proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.
The award must be merged into domestic judgment before it
can be considered a provable debt under Section 63a (5) of the
Bankruptcy Act." The court concluded that Copal must first
seek to reduce the award to judgment in federal district court.12
If successful, Copal may then submit the judgment as a proof
of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.
However, the court determined that the award, once merged
into judgment, is binding on the merits and unreviewable by
the Bankruptcy Court. In reaching this conclusion the court
of appeals relied on Article III of the UN Convention,'13 which
provides that each contracting state must recognize arbitral
awards as binding, and on Article V,14 that enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards is subject to attack only on the specific
grounds listed therein. The court also bolstered its conclusion by
pointing to domestic case law. It cited Thompson v. Magnolia5
for the principle that the Bankruptcy Court does not necessarily
have exclusive jurisdiction over a debtor's assets; Riehle v.
Margolies16 was relied upon for the proposition that a judgment
10. See Article V, UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997,
330 U.N.T.S. 38.
11. Supra, note 9.
12. 9 U.S.C. §207 (1970).
13. See Article III, UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997,
330 U.N.T.S. 38.
14. Supra, note 11.
15. 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
16. 279 U.S. 218 (1929). The court's reliance on Riehle v. Margolics appears
to have been misplaced because this case involved an equity receivership where the
receiver did not have the power to stay the state court proceedings involved. Foto-
chrome deals with a Chapter XI arrangement where the Referee does have the power
to stay suits. Further, the court in Riehle recognized that other federal court decisions
have held that judgments obtained by another court after the bankruptcy petition was
filed but before discharge are not necessarily binding on the merits for purposes of
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rendered in a court other than the Bankruptcy Court is binding
on the Bankruptcy Court, for the purpose of establishing the
amount of a claim, as long as the original court had jurisdiction
over the debtor. The court ultimately allowed the creditor, Copal,
to secure a judgment in federal district court.
In an effort to resolve this dispute without admitting poten-
tial conflict between applicable treaty and statutory law, the
court left several troublesome issues unresolved. The court did
not deal with the fact that Copal's award had attained the status
of a final judgment in Japan. Judge J. Gurfein's opinion acknowl-
edged but did not resolve the inconsistency of this decision with a
prior case, Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc.17
That case also involved an arbitral award that had attained the
status of a judgment in Curacao. The Second Circuit held in that
case that if an arbitral award results in a judgment in a foreign
country, it may be directly enforced in a state court as a foreign
money judgment. Although the UN Convention was also in effect
at the time of the Solitron decision, the court there concluded
that, because the UN Convention only goes to the enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards and not foreign judgments, it does not
preempt existing state legislation providing for enforcement of for-
eign country judgments. However, even if the court determined
that Copal's award could have been enforced as a foreign money
judgment, it was still faced with the Referee's stay of any pro-
ceedings in domestic courts to enforce any claims.
Another troublesome issue concerned the court's accept-
ance of the district court's determination that the UN Convention
was binding on the parties, although the United States did not
accede to the UN Convention until four years after the contract
proof of claim in the Bankruptcy Court, and in fact the court deliberately distinguished
those cases from a receivership situation.
17. 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974). In Solitron,
the American company had entered into an agreement with the Curaqao Government
to build a factory in Curaqao and provide employment for local employees. After a
change in local law, the venture became less profitable for Solitron Devices, Inc. and
they breached their contract. The Curaqao Government pursued arbitration as
provided in the contract, and although Solitron did not participate in the arbitration
proceedings, it received notice of all procedures. An arbitral award was issued in
the government's favor and reduced to a foreign money judgment in Curagao. The
judgment was enforced against Solitron in New York under the Uniform Foreign
Country Money judgment Recognition Act, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 5301-5309 (Mc-
Kinney).
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had been signed, and after the arbitral award had been issued.18
The UN Convention contains no retrospective language. The
court also deliberately left open the question whether the Bank-
ruptcy Court even has the authority to stay domestic arbitration.
If the Bankruptcy Court does have such authority, this decision
creates the potential for an asymmetry, in that a domestic con-
tracting party might be restrained from pursuing his arbitra-
tion remedy upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, whereas
a similarly situated foreign party may proceed to an arbitral
award. The award might then be confirmed in the federal district
court and ultimately submitted as a proof of claim in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. While the court conceded that this might
be an anomalous result, they avoided the issue and attempted
to justify the inconsistency saying only that "an American
company might procure an arbitral award in the U.S. against a
Japanese firm in financial trouble whose judgment creditors
might be under a stay from a Japanese court." 19
Vacating the Referee's restraining order with respect to
Copal would appear to have a clear, although perhaps limited
effect on the Bankruptcy Court's authority to control claims
against the debtor's estate. The court does not examine whether
such an infringement of the Bankruptcy Court's authority might
circumvent the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. Curiously, the
court stated at the outset of the case:
[T] his appeal can be decided without the necessity of deter-
mining whether the Bankruptcy Act involves a "public policy"
which is contrary to the enforcement of arbitral awards
under the Convention.2 0
The court seemed intent on reaching its decision for policy
reasons. It pointed to recent Supreme Court cases2 which have
stressed the need for encouraging international arbitration as a
means of settling transnational business disputes. Further, since
the U.S. recently acceded to the UN Convention the court took
18. Supra, note 8.
19. 512 F.2d at 519.
20. 512 F.2d at 516.
21. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), and Island Territory of
Curaqao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
986 (1974).
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this opportunity to show good faith adherence to the UN Con-
vention's provisions. Arguably the same conclusion could have
been reached by dealing more squarely with the issues, thereby
alleviating some of the confusion which results from this deci-
sion. Even assuming there was a conflict between the Bankruptcy
Act and the UN Convention, basic principles of statutory con-
struction dictate that as between an earlier statutory provision
and a subsequent Convention (duly incorporated into the munici-
pal law of the forum), the later in time prevails to the extent of the
conflict.2
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22. See J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 179 (1891), and 5 G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (1943).
